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I.  Introduction 
In modern times, the “constitution” is considered to be the most appropriate legal instrument to 
perpetuate a political compromise between entities, groups, and individuals composing the 
state. It intends to guarantee the respect of this “social contract” to which individuals and groups 
adhere, in order to stop reclaiming rights through violence but rather to obtain them through law. 
Thus, a modern constitution is often conceived as the last act of a revolution.1 
In the Palestinian context, drafting a constitution is not a result of statehood but rather part of 
the package of preconditions for achieving it. In other words, creating a new state, if not by the 
use of force—thus by imposition, needs now to be merited. The Palestinian case proves the 
relevance and dangers of dealing with this approach to constitutions and statehood. In order to 
have their own state, Palestinians must prove to the international community that they are 
serious about liberal democracy and free market policy. They furthermore need to prove their 
willingness and seriousness about reform; in other words, they have to merit their state, which is 
no more considered as part of their right to self-determination. 
Drafting a “constitution” was initially related to the “Palestinian state” declared in Algiers in 1988. 
Nevertheless, initial drafts appeared only after the Oslo Agreements, thus, undertaking the 
limitations imposed by the agreements with Israel in the constitutional text, and the new realities 
that came from them. The Basic Law is not a constitution for a sovereign state; it is transitional 
and will be replaced by the constitution, once (and if) the state (p. 584) is 
established.2 Nevertheless, preparing a constitution is considered as a step toward statehood: 
three drafts of a Palestinian constitution were prepared and presented for public debate in 
2001–2003. The “constitution,” its role, its timing and its objectives were at the center of public 
debate. 
Following the second legislative elections in 2006 and the victory of Ḥamās, political actors 
increasingly made reference to the “constitution” (or, more precisely to the Basic Law), and 
when conflict started to escalate between them, the Basic Law was largely used as a standard 
to delineate respective authorities; but there was no consensus on which binding provisions 
parties in dispute refer to. In case they do refer to the same provisions, they often do not share 
the same interpretation of the text. However, one thing was becoming increasingly clear: there 
was an urgent need to resolve internal conflict by dialogue and through permanent functioning 
institutions, in order to avoid clashes between individuals and groups that may have different 
ideologies, priorities, and interests. 
Besides, there was an urgent need to find a way out of the political impasse that resulted from 
the different agendas of the international community and the Palestinian people. In fact, the 
Palestinian choice of Ḥamās at the helm of the Palestinian Authority’s (hereafter PA) institutions 
had proven the fragility of the equilibrium between international and internal legitimacy of 
political leaders. Here as well existed an urgent need to find a solution, in order to ensure a 
minimum of legality of the new holders of power that was not based exclusively on majority 
choice but also on the way people would be governed, namely through the respect of 
individuals’ and minorities’ rights and by encouraging a peaceful coexistence between nations 
and states. 
Following the Mecca agreement between the main Palestinian factions in February 2007, 
Palestinians opted for a solution “outside the law,” and outside constitutional arrangements: 
reference was often made to what is called “national unity” or “national concordance,” a quasi-
tribal arrangement between factions, based on repartition of the public sphere between political 
factions. The expected reform and change seemed to mean the rehabilitation of old and odd 
attitudes in new disguises. The results here were very dangerous on the Palestinian system and 
institutions. From one-party institutions, civil servants, and security forces, Palestinians passed 
to more diverse but still heavily politicized public institutions. Professionalism and public interest, 
in both situations, were not the relevant criteria. 
This article argues that the constitutional and institutional anomalies described above 
contributed to the cracks among Palestinian factions, territories, and narratives in 2007, 
following Ḥamās control by force of occupied Gaza Strip. Since then, reference to the same 
Basic Law, often interpreted differently, was made to justify respective actions and decisions. 
Law was used—as often was the case in Palestinian modern history—to accommodate political 
objectives, causing damage to the process of state-building. However, the clash between 
Palestinian factions is not only about political objectives but also, this chapter argues, related to 
their national aspirations, objectives, and visions. 
II.  “We the [Palestinian] People” 
In order to explain the fact of the establishment of a legal order ex novo, there is a need to 
return a step backward, to the originating power, and the act behind the establishment of (p. 
585) that order. This is the simple conclusion that was formulated by Sieyès—the first to present 
a sophisticated and revolutionary theory of constituent power— “une constitution suppose avant 
tout un pouvoir constituant,” as distinguished from other constituted powers created by the 
constitution itself.3 However, the same fact (and here is the contradiction) of having an act 
of self-constitution, means that “someone” pretends he is talking for or in the name of that self. 
In other words, the presence of a self is revealed through the representation.4 The question, 
accordingly, converts from what or who are the “We,” in the “We the [Palestinian] People” to 
what or who represents that “We.” 
This author argues that the Oslo process and the creation of the PA over parts of the occupied 
Palestinian territory revitalized this question. The term used here (revitalized) insinuates that this 
is not the creation of the Oslo process. In fact, the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter 
PLO), as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, was challenged throughout decades 
by different actors, pretending to represent the Palestinian people, starting with the international 
community (mandate over Palestine, Partition Plan,etc.) and ending with Arab states (especially 
Jordan, and indirectly Egypt, through Arab nationalism that took different forms and shapes). 
Besides, the PLO was challenged as representative of the Palestinian people with the eruption 
of the first intifada as a genuine reaction of the Palestinian people of the occupied Palestinian 
territory toward the brutality of occupation in which Islamic groups like ās which were not 
represented in the PLO played a central role 
With Oslo the PLO entered, through the PA, in direct contact, and for the first time, with the 
Palestinians of the occupied Palestinian territory and with their legal system. However, the 
recognition of the state of Israel meant indirectly the recognition of Israeli citizenship that is 
enjoyed by more than one million Palestinians, thus excluding them from that “We” that the PLO 
represents. Besides, Oslo institutionalized most of the illegal acts undertaken by Israel in 
violation of international law. The PLO acceptance of leaving the issues of refugees, Jerusalem, 
borders, and Israeli settlements for a later stage meant the acceptance of the fragmentation of 
Palestinian land, people, and legal system. This fragmentation challenged the claim of the PLO 
to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people as it demonstrated that the inability of the 
organization to represent the wishes and needs of the Palestinian people in a convincing and 
effective manner. 
The following paragraphs shall prove how the kind of relationship that existed between the PA 
and PLO passed from complete hegemony to timid separation, then to the prevalence of PA 
institutions over the PLO. The reference to “relationship” instead of “separation” is justified by 
the fact, as will be shown, that the PLO tried not to separate itself from (p. 586) “its baby,” the 
result of the strange couple (PLO and Israel). Probably the PLO did not have another option as 
a complete separation between the PA and the PLO would have implied the de facto extinction 
of the latter. Some may even go further, suggesting that the peace process as a whole was the 
only way out for the “dying PLO” in the early nineties, for various reasons that are outside our 
consideration here. However, as shall be shown, the PA gradually substituted the PLO in many 
domains. 
The second legislative election in February 2006 signaled the second revitalization of the issue 
of PLO–PA. However, what followed the election was a return to the origins, i.e., to the PLO. 
This return was due to the will to escape the PA institutions, dominated by Ḥamās. It also 
signaled increasing requests for the reform of the PLO, its substitution, or even its dissolution. 
However, what followed the second elections was not due to the electoral results. Rather, the 
reality that followed this election showed symptoms of an earlier sickness in the body of the PA, 
and showed that the gaps in the PA legal system, combined with the flawed constitutional 
mechanisms, proved overall to be inadequate for ensuring cohabitation between both 
institutions. 
Some believed that the PA was not intended to, did not,5 and shall not6 replace the PLO as the 
sole legitimate representative (political entity and institution) of the Palestinian people, both in 
the occupied Palestinian territory and the Diaspora. However, despite the absence of discourse 
calling for the replacement of the PLO by the PA’s institutions, certain facts on the ground 
suggest that the Palestinian leadership (regardless of their intentions) has guided the PA in this 
direction.7 Four main trends have begun to take shape in the emerging system created in the 
occupied Palestinian territory following the signing of the Oslo Accords: 1) a shift in the center of 
Palestinian political life from “outside” (i.e., abroad) to the occupied Palestinian territory itself; 2) 
a growing conflict between the formulas governing Palestinian politics in exile and those 
appropriate to the “new” situation inside the occupied Palestinian territory; 3) a shift in the goal 
of demanding the right to a state on all of historic Palestine to the more “modest” goal of 
recovering territory occupied by the Israelis since 1967; and 4) the end of the “revolutionary” 
stage of the national liberation struggle and the political structures that accompanied it.8 
However, the PA, at least from the PLO perspective, was not intended to substitute the PLO 
unless all legitimate rights of the Palestinian people have been realized.9 There is no sufficient 
ground to believe that this moment was realized with the establishment of the PA. The 
objectives of the PLO will not necessarily be exhausted even with the establishment of a state.10 
Accordingly, the PLO remains the reference point for the PA. It is true that it was possible to 
establish the PA to govern parts of the occupied Palestinian territory only thanks to (p. 587) or 
because of the agreements with Israel,11 however it was the PLO Central Council that agreed on 
the formation of the PA in Tunisia October 10–12, 1993.12 The resolution entitled the PLO 
Executive Committee to form the PA Council and nominated the chairman of the PLO Executive 
Committee (Yāsir ‘Arafāt at the time) as President of the PA Council. 
Despite the above, the center of Palestinian political gravity de facto has shifted away from the 
PLO toward the PA.13 In this sense, the PA increasingly plays the role of “state in waiting” thus 
influencing and shaping the Palestinian political system and institutions.14 The PLO presence 
has become increasingly symbolic15 as a political convenience to be utilized as required16 and 
whose role is limited to the signing of agreements on behalf of, and for the benefit of, the PA. 
This tendency was consolidated by the international community, which preferred the PA as an 
authority governing Palestinians of the occupied Palestinian territory, rather than the PLO, a 
liberation movement. The most relevant example of this was the presentation of the Road Map 
peace plan by the Quartet (i.e. the EU, the U.S., Russia, and the UN) to the PA Prime 
Minister,17 Maḥmūd ‘Abbās, the first prime minister nominated after the introduction of this office, 
following the amendments to the Basic Law in 2003. (Abbās resigned shortly therafter, after less 
than six months in office.) 
Some authors observed this tendency with suspicion, and some even considered it almost a 
conspiracy,18while others saw the PA’s increasing centrality as a natural phenomenon 
commensurate with its (limited) territorial jurisdiction and administration of those Palestinians 
living in the occupied Palestinian territory. The transference of most of the PLO institutions and 
leadership to the territory under PA control initiated the gradual marginalization of PLO 
institutions as key departments, such as the PLO Political Department, which remained outside 
the occupied Palestinian territory. According to some authors, this process is irreversible19and 
the PLO will never recuperate its initial role.20 
The role of the PLO was discussed in talks on forming a National Unity Government following 
the second legislative elections and subsequent victory of Hamās.21for Abrash22 the arrival of 
Hamās in power has consequences not only for the separation of powers within the PA itself but 
also for the Palestinian political system as a whole and particularly for the representativeness of 
the PA. In other words, the participation of Hamās (whose (p. 588) members are not members 
of the PLO) in the PA elections gives the PA institutions an increasingly representative role. For 
the same author, Hamās has always presented itself as an alternative representative of the 
Palestinian people, as it is a religious-motivated group rather than the nationalistic-secular PLO. 
The reconstruction of the PLO to potentially include religious parties such as Hamās and Islamic 
Jihad would primarily resolve the question of the “secularism” of the PLO (which the two Islamic 
groups categorically oppose) in addition to resolving the question of quotas for these groups in 
the Palestinian National Council (hereafter PNC), the parliament-like body of the PLO.23 On the 
other hand, the refusal of the PLO Executive Commitee to endorse the program of Hamās 
Prime Minister Ismā‘īl Haniyyah’s first government reignited discussion at the highest levels on 
the relationship between the PA and the PLO. The PLO Executive Committee further criticized 
the lack of reference to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.24 
Khalīl Shikākī25 suggested, as early as 1997, two areas of possible conflict between the PLO 
and PA: first, the “ratification” of treaties, such as the “Hebron Protocol” of 1997, which the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (hereafter PLC) asked to review but was refused by President 
‘Arafāt, who determined that it was a matter for the PLO. The second area of possible conflict 
was the drafting of a “nationality” law, which would have inevitable repercussions on the 
Diaspora despite the fact that the Charter had already attempted to define who is a Palestinian. 
However, the participation of (West Bank and Gaza Strip) refugees in the legislative, 
presidential, and municipal elections (thus treating them effectively as “citizens”) should not be 
interpreted as a renunciation of their right to return.26 Several other examples can be presented 
concerning possible conflicts between the PLO and the PA, such as the reference to the PLO in 
the Basic Law, the need of the PLO Executive Committee’s approval on certain laws, the 
membership of the PLC deputies in the PNC, and the nomination of delegates to foreign 
countries. 
III.  The Process of Constitution-Making 
Those entitled to constituent power, as appears in the classical theory of constituent power, 
remain the people, who exercise that inner power through legitimate institutions. It can be a 
council or an assembly constituted or elected ad hoc, or the same legislative body also 
empowered to practice constituent power, or directly, through referenda. Nevertheless, the way 
the constitution is adopted, and the level of popular participation, reflects the degree of 
democracy in those procedures, and provides legitimacy for the text that has been approved. In 
other words, if the elaboration and redaction of the same constitutional text is left to a group of 
specialists or to a commission, it is necessary, to be qualified as democratic, that the 
constitution, once ready in its final shape, is presented to the people for final approval. 
The way the constitution is elaborated is important, but the way it will be adopted is also 
important; for this reason, the way constituent power is exercised, and the organs doing so, are 
in reality much more important than knowing, theoretically, who is entitled to (p. 589) that power. 
In fact, the “temporary government” that organizes the drafting process usually exploits the 
situation for its own benefit. 
The participation of the Palestinians from West Bank and Gaza Strip in the process of drafting 
the Basic Law and, at a later stage, in drafting the constitution for the Palestinian state, acquires 
additional significance. Palestinians showed enthusiasm in that they would be contributing to the 
Basic Law through their participation in the public conference that had been organized. 
An important question inevitably arises: Will Palestinians, through the PLO institutions, continue 
to have constituent power regarding amendments to the constitution, in the process of creating 
the State? Will it be exercised by Palestinians of West Bank and Gaza Strip and citizens of the 
future Palestinian State—new arrivals included? Will the PLO participate in legislation principally 
affecting the situation of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip?27 
When the PNC declared the Palestinian State in Algiers in 1988, it also decided that the new 
State would require a constitution or a basic law; the first attempts to prepare a basic law, then, 
were related to the State. A committee was appointed by PLO Executive Committee and given 
the task of preparing the first drafts of Basic Law in December 1993, and in February and 
December 1994; these drafts were the object of public discussions inside and outside the 
Palestinian territories but not by the Central Council of the PLO. 
The situation changed after the Oslo Agreements, when the attempts to prepare a Basic Law 
were related to the PA, a temporary authority administering the autonomous territories until a 
final agreement was reached. In fact, the PA started to effectively exercise its authority directly 
on Palestinian territory and people. After election of the PLC in 1996, the structure of the PA 
was changed and the draft Basic Law needed to accommodate those changes; the committee 
prepared four other drafts that were never under consideration by the president of the PA. 
The elected PLC showed immediate interest in drafting a Basic Law for the transitional period. 
Despite the original plan that the Basic Law would be endorsed by the PLO Central Council, the 
PLC insisted on its power to discuss and endorse the Basic Law. Drafting Basic Laws (in plural) 
was possible under the Interim Agreement; in fact, those Agreements detailed most of the 
provisions that the Basic Law had to include (concerning the structure of the Council). Besides, 
the same agreement provides that the Basic Law shall not contradict the Declaration of 
Principles and other agreements (between the government of Israel and the PLO), otherwise it 
would be rendered null and void. The preamble to the Election Law of 1995 confirmed that 
drafting a Basic Law was the PLC’s main task. 
It should be noted that the nomination of that constitutional text with “basic law” (qānūn asāsī) or 
“basic system” (niẓām asāsī) but never “constitution” (dustūr) was never questioned by PLO or 
PLC legal committees. It is a way to distinguish that constitutional text from the constitution to 
be endorsed after the state is established. What was rather the object of disagreement within 
the PLC was the adoption of different Basic Laws as appear in the Interim Agreement text (and 
as it is the case in Israel, where there is no constitution, but Basic Laws) or the adoption of one 
unique and complete Basic Law. 
(p. 590) The PA minister of justice transmitted the draft prepared by the PLO legal committee, 
but the PLC rejected it and commissioned its own legal committee to prepare a new draft.28 It is 
true that the final draft the PLC legal committee had presented adopted most of the articles the 
PLO legal committee had prepared, but what is significant here is the power struggle between 
PLO and PA institutions regarding who is entitled to adopt the constitutional text. The PLC 
approved almost unanimously the Basic Law draft in its third reading (Law No. 1/96) on October 
2, 1997. 
It should be noted that the Basic Law contains provisions similar to most of the Arab world 
constitutions. This is the case of the reference to Islam and Sharī‘ah (Islamic law). According to 
the Basic Law (Art. 4), the principles of Sharī‘ah are a primary source of legislation in Palestine 
and Islam is the official state religion. This reference to Islam and Sharī‘ah in a constitutional 
text does not create per se a religious or an Islamic state. It simply means that, even in a 
secular state, religion may not be totally absent from public affairs. Such interpretation of the 
constitutional reference to Islam and Sharī‘ah is more concerned with constitutional 
mechanisms aiming as protecting individuals’ and minorities’ rights. Accordingly, the reference 
to Islam in the constitution should not create any unnecessary perplexities. The same applies to 
Sharī‘ah, which is confined to the remit of positive law, as expressed in a legislative text issued 
by state authorities, mainly confined to personal status issues. In other words, the binding 
character of the Sharī‘ah in the above sense is nothing else but the free will of human authority. 
The empowerment of Sharī‘ah through the Basic Law means that a “secular will” is the origin of 
its nature and not “divine will.” 
Regardless of the way constitutional texts refer to Islam and Sharī‘ah, the important thing is to 
ensure the supremacy of the constitution. Sharī‘ah is not a source of law but rather of 
legislation. This means that, if not codified by the legislature, it does not constitute a source of 
law. The Basic Law, immediately after referring to Islam and Sharī‘ah, provides that other 
monotheistic religions, Christianity and Judaism, should have their sanctity respected and 
maintained. The respect is not enough if not translated into granting to every citizen, regardless 
of his religion, the same rights and duties. The above position is not shared by Palestinians and 
foreign observers who commented on this provision, starting from complete rejection to absolute 
support. Some even considered that the provision was too soft, in that it referred only to “a” 
source instead of the “the” and to “legislation” instead of the “law.”29 
Putting aside the above discussions, some considered the Basic Law as being the most liberal 
of Arab world constitutions, especially the list of rights and freedoms that it contains. Besides, 
the PLC’s main preoccupation was to approve a Basic Law that would define the relations 
between the Council and the executive, and the transparency of PA members on the one hand, 
and the protection of basic human rights, the implementation and respect for the PNC, and the 
independence of the judiciary, on the other. 
The President of the PA refused for many years to endorse the Basic Law, creating more 
tension between the PLC and the Executive Authority in general, and the President of the PA, in 
particular, pretending that adopting a Basic Law is not the task of the PLC but of the (p. 
591) PLO, because a constitutional text is not a matter of only West Bank and Gaza Strip 
Palestinians but of all Palestinians.30 
President ‘Arafāt endorsed the Basic Law of the PA for the Transitional Period on May 29, 2002, 
which came into force on the date of its publication, July 7, 2002, in the official 
Gazette.31 Signing the Basic Law came in a very controversial political context, as a step toward 
reforms, according to the 100-day Reform Plan. This late endorsement of the Basic Law 
contains a clear contradiction: on the one side it is the constitutional text that entered into force 
in 2002 and was to apply during the Interim Period, while on the other side the Interim period 
was theoretically already over since 1999. The Basic Law was amended in 2003 to introduce 
the office of Prime Minister32 and in 2005 to introduce changes in the electoral system and to 
limit the mandate of both President and PLC to four years rather than for the interim period. 
The PLO Executive Committee created a (new) legal committee in 1999, different from the one 
that was nominated earlier, after the declaration of independence in 1988, to draft a Palestinian 
constitution in preparation for statehood, and Yāsir ‘Arafāt appointed Minister Nabīl Sha‘th as its 
chairman. This committee was composed of qualified Palestinian constitutionalists and jurists, 
following an agreement with the Arab League to form an advisory committee of experts. The 
Draft of a Palestinian Constitution was completed on February 14, 2001,33 while negotiations 
with Israel totally collapsed. The same text was the object of revision in 2003 (a second and 
third draft were subsequently published) and of interest in the international arena, as important 
groundwork toward statehood. 
As appears in the preamble of the Third Draft of the Palestinian Constitution, the draft was 
submitted to the Palestinian Central Committee on March 9, 2003. The Council approved the 
draft and voiced appreciation for the work of the committee, its experts, and advisors. The 
Council advised the committee to pursue its work and meet with the legal committee of the 
Central Council and other committees to discuss the draft in view of its final discussion and 
approval at the next Central Committee meeting.34 
The preparation of a Palestinian constitution was part of the reforms requested by the 
internationally-backed Road Map for Peace, which called for reforms and the establishment of a 
Palestinian State by 2005 (later postponed). It was also conceived as one of the steps (p. 
592) necessary for statehood. The way the constitution will be adopted in the Palestinian 
context is of extreme importance. According to Art. 185 of the Third Draft of the Palestinian 
Constitution, there are different steps necessary to take, before adopting the constitution. First, 
the PNC (or the Central Council if the PNC were unable to convene) would approve the draft 
constitution, before the establishment of the State. Second, a two-thirds majority in the first 
elected House of Representatives would approve the draft, after the creation of the State. Third, 
in the case where the absolute majority decided to submit the constitution to a referendum, the 
constitution would be adopted if it obtained the simple majority of votes.35 
IV.  International Impact on the Palestinian Constituency 
Modern constitutionalism has shown that the enactment of a nation’s fundamental law can no 
longer be seen as a matter of purely domestic concern, although it is rightly considered as the 
first act (in terms of importance, and not necessarily in chronological terms) of national or 
popular sovereignty. States and international organizations become central actors in 
constitution-making, while the people, those entitled to sovereignty, remain, at least 
theoretically, those entitled to constituent power also, and adopt (or reject) the constitution in 
toto. The people are “free” to accept that constitution with the political and economic system it 
represents. This legal fiction is necessary since popular adherence is needed to ensure 
legitimacy for the state and the authority, and not only to provide a legacy for that text. 
The international impact on the Palestinian constitutional system can be measured by three 
major aspects:36first, by the adoption of norms that are directly inspired from occidental 
democratic constitutions; second, by the adoption of similar institutions based on occidental 
models; and third, by taking part in, and the incorporation of, theoretical debates about the new 
democracies. 
The international community stresses the incorporation of a series of rights and liberties 
protecting individuals within the constitutional documents of the newly formed states. These 
demands are part of the movement of universalization of human rights that dates to the pre–
World War II concepts. Yet, it seems that there is more than one theory of human rights that can 
acquire the constitutional status in the Western legal jurisprudence today; (p. 593) the classical 
rights also called formal, or the rights of the first generation, in addition to other sets of rights 
such as the social rights, bioethics, and environmental rights. 
The Palestinian constitutional documents have largely incorporated those different sets of rights. 
However, the inclusion of those rights in the constitutional texts, although an important step, 
may be insufficient or even counter-productive. It may be insufficient because constitutional 
texts are often not accompanied with constitutional and legal mechanisms to enforce, protect, 
and guarantee those constitutional rights. It may be counter-productive because states often 
misinterpret the inclusion of those rights in the constitutional texts as authorization for the state 
to discard them, since created by it, through the inclusion in the constitutional text. 
On a different note, it seems that the French presidential model has particularly seduced the 
Palestinian constituent in the same way it seduced many Arab neighboring states. In Palestine 
there is a parliamentary system, but with two executive heads, a President directly elected and 
a Prime Minister sharing some of his functions with the President. Yet it seems that the 
Palestinian constituent had additional models of inspiration concerning the way the powers are 
separated, as more “orthodox” parliamentary choices were made based on the German or the 
English model, such as cabinet meetings, or the motion of no confidence against the 
government. 
The Palestinians seemed also to integrate some parts of the American model and to even go 
further; the United States was one of the first systems that created independent agencies to 
deal with matters that should be kept separate from the bureaucratic system, in order to ensure 
their partiality and independence. Palestinians seemed to adopt this model by constitutionalizing 
certain agencies, especially concerning the protection of citizens’ rights, and financial 
transparency. The two main examples are the Palestinian Independent Commission for 
Citizens’ Rights, which is the Palestinian ombudsman, and the Financial and Administrative 
Control Bureau. 
It seems like the jurisprudential discussions about the shape of modern democracies have also 
been a matter of a Palestinian constitutional debate. Is Palestine going to follow the continental 
European vision of democracy or the Anglo-Saxon? 
According to the European approach, specialized institutions are given the task to review the 
legality and constitutionality of acts taken by the state authorities (through specialized 
administrative bodies and even courts). A special tribunal is even given the power to control the 
parliament’s actions, ensuring its conformity with the supreme law, the constitution. On the 
contrary, according to the monist approach to law and justice individuals, as much as state 
apparatus, are under the scrutiny of the same judge, applying the same common law. 
The continental approach ensures the respect of the law by all institutions of the state via the 
procedure of judicial review, including parliament. This possibility of review gives the state of 
law its meaning, where every normative creation by the state abides by the supreme legal 
document that is the constitution; thus there must be a clear hierarchy of norms in which the 
inferior act acquires its validity from the higher, a document that contradicts the norm that 
validates it must be annulled. 
It seems that Palestinians, by creating a constitutional court, have chosen the continental 
Europe approach. This choice might constitute some legal problems in Palestine as long as the 
transitional situation is not over yet, because a clear hierarchy must be established to norms 
created by different entities, such as the relationship between the PA’s institutions and those 
belonging to the PLO. 
In addition, the Palestinian legal system is separated between one set of law applicable to 
state’s actions in its capacity as public authority (administrative law) and another set applying to 
equal individuals (civil law). The Supreme Court in its capacity of High Supreme Court is entitled 
to judge all administrative disputes as first and last instance court. 
(p. 594) V.  Conclusion 
Palestinian constitution-making is no different from other constitution-making experiences that 
followed World War II. It shows and proves what was referred to in the constitutional literature 
as the internationalization of constituent power.37 In this sense, it may be considered as a 
healthy phenomenon that contributes to developing constitutional law and enhancing 
constitutional movement in contemporary states. 
This phenomenon, nevertheless, may have negative symptoms. The international community 
may confuse the need of constitutions for new-born states with the imposition of a particular 
constitutional model. The foreign and cooperation policy of certain democracies may be partially 
determined by the adherence of new and weak states to such a model. The risk here is to 
suffocate the local population, its particularities and its culture. This may have a boomerang 
effect, with negative consequences, even as far as complete rejection, since the constitution 
may be considered as an outside product. 
Modern constitutions, in fact, tend to convert from a highly desired expression of self-
determination to a highly rejected self-limitation (or rather, a pseudo self-limitation). Modern 
constitutions become the domestic legal instrument to “impose” international conditions and 
limits. In this sense, the constitution becomes an instrument to impose on new-born entities 
wishing to be part of the “club of states,” a minimum of rules considered as the basis of the 
international community: the pacific coexistence between territorially defined states. In this 
direction, several international resolutions were made concerning a solution for the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. Several bilateral and multilateral treaties were signed by the PLO with the Israelis 
and some other countries; all these treaties seem to aim for a solution based on the creation of 
two separate states.38 
While reviewing existing literature on what can be called largely the “Palestinian constitution,” 
one can notice that there is not a consensus on what is being scrutinized exactly. This is 
reflected in the analysis made by Palestinian authors. This difference explains many of the 
existing dichotomies in conclusions and positions. 
Scholarships related to Palestinian constitution reflect three different kinds of assumptions. 
Some perceive the PA as central authority of sovereign state. For this group, a constitution 
refers simply to the Basic Law, adopted by the PLC in 1997, endorsed by President ‘Arafāt in 
2002, and amended later on in 2003 and 2005. Others refer to the “Palestinian state” in the 
abstract, outside of the current status of the Palestinian people and land. Such vision is 
expressed in the PLO charter of 1968 and the Declaration of Independence in Algiers in 1988. 
Finally, others refer to what can be called the “official version” of the state. This vision is the one 
of the draft(s) Palestinian constitution, prepared by a constitutional committee in 2001 and 2003. 
The discussions on the constitutional framework of the PA (thus, taking into account the Basic 
Law’s provisions and limitations of the Oslo Accords) indirectly contribute to an (p. 
595) understanding of how a future State of Palestine would look. This approach can be 
considered pragmatic and realistic. Some look at the existing institutions and imagine the 
possible political system of their future state,39 while others look at the PA and simply see the 
state (at the same time seeing Palestine as an existent reality under occupation or in status 
nascendi). 
One may argue, rightly, that a “state” refers to a totally different experience from that of the PA 
with its limited powers, jurisdiction, and related uncertainties of the interim period: indeed the 
Basic Law was enacted for the interim period, although there is always the possibility that the 
transitional will become permanent. This is not to argue, however, that the particular experience 
of the PA need not be considered, and the reason is simple; the nascent PA institutions and 
laws will most likely serve, at least in the beginning, as the new institutions of a new Palestinian 
state. The state will not start ex nihilo because it will inherit existing PA institutions and 
laws,40 including those pre-PA legislation that remained in force during the interim period, and 
even some PLO-produced texts (such as the PLO Penal Code and Procedures of 1979, still 
applicable on military courts). 
In this sense the Palestinian state does not represent a clearcut departure from pre-existing 
concepts and institutions. The Palestinian state is not a new building; rather, it is a new floor in 
the same building. In fact, the Basic Law created constitutional and political arrangements, as 
well as interests and institutions that will be difficult to dislodge.41 The State of Palestine, 
therefore, will necessarily absorb these preceding institutions while abiding by the legal and 
political texts produced by them. In fact, each historical/political period has impacted on the 
development of the Palestinian legal system. 
In fact, the tendency of the authorities that controlled Palestine, or part of it, since the early 
1990s, was always to build on the existing legal system, making the necessary adaptations to 
accommodate the new regime. In this sense, there has never been a complete rejection of 
previous laws and regulations but rather they have been maintained until amended by new 
ones. In 1994, PLO Chairman Yāsir ‘Arafāt issued Decree No. 1—“Continuation of the Laws, 
Regulations and Rules Operative in the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) 
before and since 5 June 1967”—until such time as it may be replaced by a unified PA 
legislation. The same technique was adopted by the Basic Law (Art. 119) and also the Third 
Draft of a Palestinian Constitution (Art. 187), thus linking the current PA with a future Palestinian 
state. 
The Palestinian state may also be viewed in abstract terms as a historical entity that either 
already exists (without knowing where it is precisely) or which ought to exist (without deciding 
where it should be). Such a state is based on religious, moral, or cultural considerations, or on 
international law and legitimacy, or is simply a reflection of imagined or recognized “rights.” This 
image is then compared, analyzed, and enriched by the experiences of other countries. In other 
words, this group sees other states, including neighboring Arab states, and then they imagine 
how the Palestinian state looks or what it shall look like, irrespective of the facts on the ground. 
This is the vision of the PLO Charter, successive resolutions of the PNC, and several 
declarations of Palestinian leaders. This vision of the state clashes with realities on the ground. 
(p. 596) The Draft of a Palestinian Constitution was prepared largely in response to the PA’s 
international obligations under the Road Map peace plan but also as a step toward preparation 
for statehood, considered by Palestinians as the final objective of the interim period, the core of 
final status negotiations. The lack of legal value of such a text before its adoption and 
endorsement must surely be noted. However, the Draft of a Palestinian Constitution, and the 
discussions about it, may provide a vision of how Palestinians conceive the state, the way 
powers will be separated, and the principles that will guide public institutions, and most 
importantly, how the new constitution would be adopted. They best express the vision of the 
state prevailing among Palestinians. 
The publication of the three drafts initiated several discussions and studies at different levels, 
although arguments were presented according to party political affiliations.42 The most important 
characteristic of these discussions concerns the difference between the “official” version and 
“unofficial” version of events. The official version comes from the declarations of various PA 
personnel and/or from members of the Constitutional Committee, which was nominated by 
President ‘Arafāt in 1999, consequently leading to allegations of impartiality and unwarranted 
control by the executive.43 For Palestinian civil society, notwithstanding the importance of PA 
obligations to the international community, the importance of the constitution stems from its role 
in determining the social contract between the state and the individual.44 The Draft of a 
Palestinian Constitution, in comparison to the Basic Law, does not introduce any substantial 
changes to the legal and political system under the PA. 
In this chapter, the discussion turned around the way constitutional documents were drafted, the 
way the Basic Law was adopted, and the way the Draft of a Palestinian Constitution will be 
endorsed. Shall constitution-making lead to the creation of viable and democratic institutions, 
and contribute to state-building, or shall it contribute to its demise? In all circumstances, this 
chapter has argued, constitution-making and state-building contribute to and urge for the 
redefinition of the Palestinian nation and of those who represent it. 
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